Marine Corps Gazette

: FIASCO: The American Military Adventure in Iraq
By Thomas E. Ricks $27.95
(Member $25.15)

Operation AL FAJR

by CDR John Patch, USN

Enduring MOUT principles make the fight for Fallujah a success.

While the combat phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) reasserted American supremacy in a classic combined arms campaign on open terrain, success against the protracted insurgency in urban areas is more elusive. As a recent analysis argued, “The very success of American joint operations—and joint fires in particular—guarantee that a clever opponent will move into cities for protection.”¹ While cautionary maxims oft-repeated since Sun Tzu’s time point to avoiding cities, the U.S. military must be prepared to defeat the urban adversary when war aims demand it. Military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) are not new phenomena, but some pundits bemoaned coalition readiness prior to Operation AL FAJR (OAF) (also known as Operation PHANTOM FURY) in Fallujah. Though neither sterile nor quick, OAF proved not to be the feared bloody quagmire that other armies historically faced. In the tradition of Hue City, coalition forces under the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) successfully breached Fallujah’s defenses and seized the city, eliminating a key insurgent stronghold. Several key factors contributed to rapid tactical/operational victory—the virtual absence of civilians; effective MOUT doctrine, tactics, and command and control (C²); and adherence to the laws of war, especially regarding joint fires.² Extant joint and Service doctrine discusses MOUT characteristics and caveats in detail;³ many apply to this article but are not restated here. A pithy description of the urban dilemma is that:

The enemy’s plan is simple and effective: lure American forces into terrain where Information Age knowledge, speed, and precision give way to the more traditional advantages of mass, will, patience, and the willingness to die.⁴

An examination of the OAF experience sheds light on enduring MOUT principles and offers some preconditions for potential success.

“We are naval troops used to landing on foreign ground. . . . We were 350 miles from the sea, but the service culture stays with us and helped us to stay attentive in that our tactics were as important in the fighting phase as our cultural awareness was during the stability ops.”

—MajGen James N. Mattis,
Commanding General, 1st Marine Division

Principles To Be Considered
First, a significant positive factor was simply the absence of the vast majority of the population. Early in the precombat phase of operations, I MEF made a concerted effort to persuade the insurgents to lay down their weapons or face death. Many clearly chose to depart, attenuating over time the enemy order of battle. So, too, did the majority of civilians. The assault’s imminence became apparent as more and more forces arrived at the outskirts of the city. Surely, recent I MEF operations in Najaf also demonstrated that I MEF meant business, would risk casualties, and would call in heavy fires when necessary to accomplish the mission. By 8 November 2004, civilians had left the city in droves; as much as 80 percent of the 250,000 to 300,000 people departed.⁵ I MEF did not force the populace to depart but encouraged them via leaflets and media to that effect. Some pundits alleged that the frequent airstrikes from April to November were designed to terrorize the population and drive them out.⁶ Regardless of intentions, airstrikes likely did cause many to depart. The virtual absence of civilians in MOUT is rare, making OAF somewhat unique. It simplified the tasks of distinguishing combatants from noncombatants and employing heavier fires.⁷ In fact, ground commanders involved with the April 2004 Fallujah assault espoused the benefits of removing civilians from the melee.⁸ Specifically, it expedites the doctrinal MOUT objective of isolating the enemy without the negative consequences of a cordon and siege on a tenant population. Further, resources typically needed to ascertain the nature and extent of collateral concerns on the battlefield are available instead for offensive priorities. In certain MOUT scenarios, ground force commanders would do well to facilitate the departure of civilians, perhaps with the preassault establishment of large internally displaced persons centers. Although reports of OAF civilian casualties surfaced, many proved exaggerated or baseless, and the Arab street outcry was muted. Indeed, I MEF reported no known civilian deaths by D+11.⁹ Thus one reason the enemy did not win the OAF information war was the minimal civilian casualties due to the evacuation.

OAF was designed to remove anti-Iraq forces
from Fallujah. (Photo by Sgt Luis R. Agostini.)

Second, the weight of evidence indicates that Marine leaders, steeped in MOUT lessons learned, applied this unique aspect of operational art to OAF joint planning, strategy, and tactics. This was a daunting task, considering the MOUT defender’s advantages as well as the local support and sanctuary and the months the insurgents had to establish weapons caches and C². For instance, I MEF applied the MOUT dictum of overwhelming force and firepower, leading a large force of seasoned Marine and Army battalions supported by a mix of joint fires.¹⁰ As many as 15,000 coalition troops and 2,000 Iraqis¹¹ provided both physical wherewithal and psychological impact. Of course, I MEF had sufficient time and resources to plan and mass forces—not always the case in MOUT. I MEF also exploited existing MOUT doctrine, most of which was either Marine Corps produced or filled with examples from Marine operations. Even the use of a 64-year-old Marine Corps urban warfare primer, disparaged by the press at the time, contributed to success. Additionally, Marine Corps institutional appreciation for military history and post-Cold War MOUT trends shaped predeployment Marine training. For example, several courses of instruction, large-scale Marine exercises, and deployment workups focus on MOUT.¹² Navy and Marine air wings similarly train to strike targets on urban mockup ranges. Allied MOUT experience, from exchange officer programs to attendance at the British Army’s Copehill Downs MOUT training center¹³ and the Israeli Defense Force’s Adam Counterinsurgency Urban Warfare training facility,¹⁴ is also integral to Marine Corps MOUT instruction. MOUT tactics, long part of the Marine toolbox, are increasingly a high priority for Army personnel as well.¹⁵ Air Force MOUT training emphasis is more limited, but they lead the development of air-to-ground munitions optimal for MOUT. I MEF leaders clearly utilized the Corps’ MOUT expertise, with units rehearsing MOUT tactics outside Fallujah prior to the offensive, incorporating fighting techniques used in Vietnam, Israeli territories, Chechnya, Somalia and, most recently, Najaf and Karbala.¹⁶ Still, Marines stress that the Corps must do more to “develop and advance an urban-warfare ethos and mind-set.”¹⁷ Services are still compiling OAF lessons learned,¹⁸ promising ample fodder for future professional articles; Quantico is leading the way in this ongoing analysis.

One uniquely Marine modus operandi was also critical to OAF success—keeping the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) intact under one commander. Marines inherently train to fight as such and applied MAGTF MOUT strengths¹⁹ in OAF, while incorporating Army ground units and joint fires. Integral Marine aircraft delivered the majority of bombs during OAF, but I MEF did maintain the link back to the Coalition Forces Air Component Commander’s (CFACC’s) joint airpower, with Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft contributing to the many close air support (CAS) missions. The press also highlighted the hundreds of rounds of daily Marine and Army artillery supporting ground units clearing the city.²⁰ (Notably, indirect fires do not seem to have resulted in significant civilian casualties.) Other successful MAGTF MOUT tactics included infantry-supported armor, heavy reliance on snipers, and typical Marine Corps ingenuity, such as heavy bulldozers to destroy or bury insurgent defenses. I MEF also exploited non-lethal fires when appropriate. I MEF’s huge “MAGTF-plus” dwarfed other coalition division-sized elements but effectively incorporated joint and MAGTF MOUT strengths under a single Marine commander.

Fourth, I MEF’s methodical approach to OAF demonstrated sound MOUT C^2. For example, I MEF prudently directed sector-by-sector (vice wholesale) urban clearing—disciplined building-to-building movement—often at the consternation of Washington leaders seeking a quick win. Indeed, the pace of MOUT (I MEF leaders asserted the combat phase of operations was over in 11 days²¹) can determine the operation’s outcome, though each MOUT scenario is different. Accelerating an operation for political expediency can spell disaster, while not exploiting fleeting battlefield opportunities can extend the duration of fighting. Clausewitzian theory suggests either a deliberate cordon to await conditions favorable for the attacker or simply bypassing urban areas not critical to war aims.²² OAF execution seems to reflect elements of both, with a gradually tightening cordon and limited indirect attacks²³ and then an eventual siege but only at one decisive city. Coalition resources limit the number and scope of MOUT campaigns, of course. The indirect approach alone, however, would likely not work in all MOUT scenarios. One cannot discount the significant resources and time to effect a cordon or the requirement to “go downtown” in some circumstances. I MEF C² apparently orchestrated the intensity, simultaneity, and pace of maneuver and fires to good effect in OAF. Conversely, poor MOUT C² or ineffective joint coordination increases the chances of fratricide, excessive collateral damage (CD), and even operational failure. Russian pilots acting independently of ground troops in Grozny and unity of command problems in Mogadishu are good cases in point.²⁴

Fight damage to infrastructure and residents will
occur in MOUT. (Photo by Sgt Luis R. Agostini.)

Due diligence to the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) was another key to OAF success. In fact, it did not compromise “military effectiveness” as some suggest—if strategic victory is the gauge of success. OAF execution demonstrated CD consideration at all echelons; commensurate rules of engagement (ROE) followed. Marine leaders showed awareness of protected sites, even in areas devoid of civilians, carefully controlling fires in measured, proportional responses. Fallujah insurgents, however, clearly disregarded LOAC; insurgents used 60 of the 100-plus mosques for military purposes,²⁵ technically making them legitimate military targets.²⁶ Knowing Americans are loath to attack protected sites, this insurgent violation mirrors the larger combatant use of the urban area itself (normally protected) for military purposes. CD concerns also influenced joint fires decisions, including the use of delayed fusing and smaller weapons selection for MAGTF and CFACC fixed-wing aircraft²⁷—mainly smaller precision weapons like the GBU–38 (500-pound joint direct attack munition (JDAM)) and AGM–65 Maverick. While not technological panaceas, JDAM accuracy and smaller warheads reduce the potential for CD. Additionally, supporting the civilian departure was clearly in line with LOAC principles. Finally, while LOAC due diligence can be a factor in strategic success, political pressure to avoid friendly and civilian casualties will likely always put joint warfighters on the horns of a dilemma. Efforts to protect noncombatants typically mean increased risk to coalition forces, while tactics to reduce risks to friendlies put civilians in harm’s way.²⁸ Thankfully, meaningful LOAC training and enlightened senior leadership seem to be the Marine Corps norm.

CAS in MOUT
The prudent use of heavier fires as a critical MOUT procedure deserves further discussion. MOUT doctrine explicitly calls for selective and precise joint fires, especially regarding air-to-ground ordnance.²⁹ Doctrine focuses on the difficulty of identifying targets themselves, while avoiding fratricide and CD, but more importantly, taking the potential operational/strategic impact of joint fires into account. Sensible OAF weapons choice and fires planning arguably saved coalition lives, prevented fratricide, and shortened the operation. Though the vast majority of the fires were apparently reactive—mortars, artillery, helicopter gunships, and fixed-wing CAS for troops in contact—joint procedures, such as gridded reference graphics and mensurated aim points for on-call CAS targets,³⁰ helped expedite, simplify, and control the effects of heavy urban fires. I MEF’s CAS emphasis (roughly 50 missions daily in the combat phase) demonstrated an appreciation for doctrine, history, and LOAC/ROE, even as some pundits criticized the dearth of deliberate airstrikes in the first few days.³¹ Moreover, the all-weather GBU–38 (laser-guided bombs require clear line of sight and continuous illumination³²) proved decisive, providing greater precision and lethality against defended buildings than MAGTF artillery or helicopter fires. Add to that its high-impact angle, low circular error probable, and comparatively small blast and fragmentation outside targeted buildings and the warfighter has a significant new “low CD” MOUT weapon.³³ Notably, the USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) air wing was the first to deploy the Navy GBU–38 in urban combat.³⁴ Other near-term developments optimal for MOUT include global positioning system (GPS)-guided 155mm artillery rounds, Navy 5-inch extended range guided munitions, the small-diameter bomb, and tactical Tomahawk.³⁵ Notwithstanding recent advances, many traditional U.S. military firepower strengths remain marginalized in MOUT.³⁶ OAF truly demonstrated, however, that lighter, precise joint fires enhance the chances for successful MOUT when wielded by enlightened practitioners of the art of war.

Mitigating CD
Local and international expectation and perception management before OAF seems to have improved the chances for success as well. While media predictions of a protracted imbroglio proved inaccurate, early U.S. estimates of heavy fighting helped shape public opinion. Whether OAF coalition casualties were “heavy” or not is debatable, but they were markedly lower than other historical examples. The press cited as few as 51 U.S. troops killed and 425 wounded; in comparison, 2,800 Russian troops died in the 1995 Grozny assault.³⁷ In all fairness, OAF operations continued into May, with occasional U.S. casualties, but OAF friendly—and civilian—casualties were “light enough” to avoid strategic failure. While MOUT experts and doctrine caveat the potential strategic repercussions of friendly casualties, OAF’s unique circumstances and U.S. military supremacy were mitigating factors. The next MOUT scenario may not be so propitious. Further, after Najaf and Karbala, any expectations of minimal OAF CD were pure naiveté. Of course, civilian casualties are only part of the CD equation. Damage to infrastructure, residences, and other protected sites is going to occur. Although physical damage can be repaired, significant reconstruction costs should be expected in MOUT (authorities estimate $500 million to repair Fallujah infrastructure and the 32,000 destroyed homes).³⁸ Before the first shot is fired, careful efforts to inform global decisionmakers and public opinion are advisable. The Hue Marine tactical victory is an example where careful information management might have prevented a strategic failure, when the costly, high-profile battle eroded the U.S. will to fight. Without expectation management, bloody media coverage and MOUT’s heavy resource toll can make battlefield successes moot.

Phase IV Operations
Finally, I MEF OAF planning and execution demonstrated keen understanding that Phase IV urban operations will make or break the larger campaign. Although inglorious, the complexities associated with Phase IV eclipse those of the combat phase:

The urban warrior must deal with refugees, media, curfews, crowd control, municipal government, street gangs, schools, armed citizens, disease, mass casualties, police, cultural sites, billions of dollars of private property, infrastructure and religion, to name but a few factors.³⁹

Marines setting up a vehicle checkpoint in Fallujah.
(Photo by SSgt Georgi Hernandez.)

Marines’ successes stem partially from training that molds a force ready for both combat and the often more strategically important follow-on operations. A recent analysis contended that heavyhanded U.S. Army OIF postcombat urban operations contributed to the entrenched insurgency, while Marine “small wars” experience permitted greater Phase IV successes in their areas of responsibility.⁴⁰ Marine Corps institutional emphasis on cultural, language, and peacekeeping/reconstruction training via the focus on military operations other than war paid off in Fallujah. Long before OAF D-day, elaborate Phase IV planning and resource marshaling was underway at Camp Fallujah, the I MEF headquarters. Civil-military operations teams later followed closely behind combat elements to begin the difficult work of humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and establishing law and order. Further, Quantico continues to develop skills for the “three block war,” using the Fallujah experience in ongoing seminars and major U.S. Joint Forces Command wargames designed to explore innovative interagency approaches to complex joint and combined MOUT.⁴¹ Even with all of the Phase IV doctrine, training, planning, and joint military wherewithal, OAF illustrated this vital requirement for interagency coordination to bring resources from outside the Department of Defense (DoD) to bear, especially funds for postcombat normalization.⁴² Notably, significant OAF Phase IV operations continue. At the writing of this article, 5 months after decisive combat operations ceased—OAF strategic victory is not yet fully assured.⁴³

To maintain military supremacy, the United States must seek to master the urban conundrum and fully incorporate this capability into the American way of war. Political and military leaders would do well to embrace the likelihood of future MOUT and support continued refinement of doctrine, training, and specialized capabilities. OAF mission accomplishment demonstrated that the question of urban warfare is not if it can be done, but whether it is advisable in each case, and if the U.S. public and decisionmakers are willing to pay the costs in blood and treasure. OAF serves as a unique MOUT historical example—nothing like Stalingrad, for instance, where the population fought alongside Russian troops defending the homeland against an invading army. Similarly, Fallujah’s sprawl is nowhere near as vast an urban terrain as Sarajevo or Beirut (though the terrain and construction presented myriad unique challenges). At a minimum, the high-visibility fight for Fallujah likely convinced insurgents that coalition forces will bring the fight to them in any terrain. At best, the OAF operational victory provides a case study reinforcing the current DoD “cognitive transformation” initiative.⁴⁴ If history is an accurate measure, other more potentially potent aggressors outside Iraq also took away some lessons—Americans will fight in the city, they will fight knowing casualties will occur, and they will unleash overwhelming force to achieve legitimate war aims.

Marines train to fight and kill on the urban battlefields of tomorrow. We need warriors with these skills—warriors instilled with the Corps ethos of honor and valor even in the bloodiest fights. As demonstrated in OAF, MOUT will always exacerbate the fog and friction of war; however, sound tactics and planning, produced by artful leadership, can mitigate its most deleterious effects. Time will tell whether OAF proved a decisive blow against the insurgent network, but urban warfare is here to stay. Since Marines embraced this truism earlier than other Services, they remain the best hope of success in the next urban fight. As such, they should lead the effort to consolidate the plethora of MOUT doctrine, evaluate new technologies, and develop and teach MOUT tactics, perhaps from a national MOUT analysis center in Quantico. Similarly, decisionmakers should consolidate the Service training facilities into a single, large urban live fire range for joint exercises, as Marines, like their Army brethren, will never move into cities alone. History will show that Marines led a force of “magnificent bastards” into Fallujah, truly living up to the credo of “no better friend, no worse enemy.”

Notes

1. Leonhard, LTC Robert R., USA(Ret), “Sun Tzu’s Bad Advice: Urban Warfare in the Information Age,” Army Magazine, available at http://www.ausa.org/www/armymag.nsf/0/ AA1C74DA9302525585256CDF005EED3D?OpenDocument, April 2005 archives.

2. This article deals only with OAF. Assessments may or may not apply to previous Fallujah operations. See Mackubin T. Owens, “Two, Three, Many Fallujahs,” The Weekly Standard, December 2004, available at http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/oped/owens/04/fallujah.html, accessed 10 April 2005, and Jim Krane, “Fallujah Declared Success: General Credits Lessons Learned in Failed April Assault on City,” San Diego Tribune, 15 November 2004, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041115/news_1n15iraq.html, accessed 5 March 2005.

3. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3–06 (JP 3–06), Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations, Washington, DC, 16 September 2002. JP 3–06 references serve as a good baseline for the plethora of MOUT doctrine.

4. Scales, MG Robert, USA(Ret), “Urban Warfare: A Soldier’s View,” Military Review, January-February 2005, p. 9.

5. Al-Badrani, Fadil, “Falluja Retrunees Angry, ‘City Unfit for Animals’,” Reuters, 23 December 2004, available at
http://www.ccmep.org/2004_articles/iraq/122404_fallujah.htm.

6. Stannard, Matthew B., “U.S., Iraqi Troops Mass for Assault on Fallujah,” San Francisco Chronicle, 6 November 2004, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/041106-fallujah-assault.htm, accessed 1 March 2005.

7. Keiler, Jonathan, “Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?,” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD, January 2005, p. 59.

8. Naylor, Sean D., “‘Paying the Price’ for Pulling Out: Commanders See a Tough Fight to Retake Fallujah,” Army Times, 4 October 2004, available at http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=1-ARMYPAPER-369620.php, accessed 10 March 2005.

9. Sattler, LtGen John A., Defense Department Operational Update Briefing, 18 November 2004, available at http://www. defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20041118-1606.html, accessed 15 April 2005 via http://www.GlobalSecurity.org.

10. Keiler, p. 59.

11. Ibid. In comparison, some 50,000 Russian troops were needed to effectively cordon the smaller Grozny in 2000. See Timothy Thomas, “Russian Lessons Learned From the Battle of Grozny,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 2000, p. 45.

12. Kennedy, Harold, “Marines Seek Better Training, Gear for Urban Combat, “ National Defense Magazine, July 2005 accessed at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Jul/Marines_Seek.htm, accessed 16 August 2006.

13. Glenn, Russell W., Marching Under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat, Chapter Four: “MOUT Training,” Rand Corporation, 1998, p. 13.

14. Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), “Israel Assists U.S. Forces, Shares Lessons-Learned Fighting Terrorists: Fallujah Success Capitalized on IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] Know-How,” 27 December 2004, available at http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/1701/documentid/2774/history/
3,2360,655,1701,2774, accessed 4 March 2005.

15. Sample, SFC Doug, USA, “Soldiers Explain Army Urban Warfare Doctrine,” Armed Forces Press Service, DoD, 27 November 2002, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2002/n11272002_200211272.html, accessed 20 March 2005. The Army recently began MOUT training at its state-of-the-art facility at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA.

16. “Warplanes Continue To Hit Targets in Falluja: Allawi Issues Warning as Offensive Looms on Anti-U.S. Stronghold,” 15 November 2004, available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/11/05/iraq.main/, 8 March 2005. Also Tom Shanker, “Past Battles Won and Lost Helped in Falluja Assault,” The New York Times, 22 November 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com, accessed 10 April 2005.

17. Houlgate, Maj Kelly P., “Urban Warfare Transforms the Corps,” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD, November 2004, available at http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_1104_Urban-P1,00.html, accessed 6 March 2005. Maj Houlgate criticizes the lack of Marine combined arms live fire training.

18. Sherman, Jason, “Pentagon Panel To Boost Urban Defenses,” Defense News, 6 December 2004, available at http://www.defensenews.com/sgmlparse2.php?F=archive2/20041206/atpc15834960.sgml, accessed 2 March 2005. OAF’s many lessons learned mirror those of previous analyses found in sources cited throughout. For a good summary, see Glenn, Chapter 7: “Recommendations” and LTC Robert F. Hahn II, USA, “Urban Warfare and the Urban Fighters of 2025,” Parameters, Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, KS, Summer 1999, pp. 74–86.

19. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–53.3, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 26 April 1998 p. 1–13.

20. Spinner, Jackie, “Artillerymen Clear Path for the Infantry,” The Washington Post, 11 November 2004, p. A33.

21. Sattler.

22. Field Manual 3–06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, Headquarters U.S. Army, Appendix H, 9 November 2004, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-06-11/toc.htm, accessed 10 March 2005. Also see Michael Howard and Peter Paret, On War, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1984, p. 412.

23. Scales, “The Indirect Approach: How U.S. Military Forces Can Avoid the Pitfalls of Future Urban Warfare,” Armed Forces Journal International, 136, October 1998, pp. 71–72.

24. Vick, Alan, et al., Aerospace Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New Concepts, Appendix D: “Lessons Learned From Past Urban Air Operations,” Rand Corporation, 2000, p. 12. Also see Field Manual 3–06, Urban Operations, Appendix C, June 2003, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-06/index.html, accessed 15 April 2005.

25. JINSA.

26. Waxman, Matthew C., International Law and the Politics of Urban Air Operations, Chapter 2: “The Law of Armed Conflict and Urban Air Operations,” Rand Corporation, 2000, p.10, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1175/index.html.

27. Irwin, Sandra, “Urban Fighting in Iraq Spurs New Thinking in Strike Aviation,” National Defense, November 2004, available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/Nov/UrbanFighting.htm, accessed 2 March 2005.

28. Waxman, Chapter 3: “Political Constraints on Urban Operations,” p. 1.

29. JP 3–06, Appendix B, “Joint Fires for Urban Operations.”

30. JP 3–09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support, Washington, DC, 3 September 2003, pp. III–18, V–51. See also Headquarters U.S. Air Force (XOL), “Operation ANACONDA: An Air Power Perspective,” Washington, DC, 7 February 2005, p. 56.

31. Keiler, p. 9; Sattler.

32. Air Land Sea Application Center, Aviation Urban Operations, 15 April 2001, pp. IV–9 and C–1.

33. Jensen, Ron, “Latest Bombing Technology Helps Reduce Risk to Iraqi Civilias,” Stars and Stripes, http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=26319&archive=true.

34. Department of the Navy, Navy Newsstand, 9 November 2004, available at http://www.news.navy.mil/list_single.asp?id=18714, accessed 9 March 2005.

35. Scully, Megan, “Smart Artillery: U.S. Wants to Adapt Weapon for Street Fighting,” Defense News, 29 November 2004, available at http://www.defensenews.com/sgmlparse2.php?F=archive2/20041129/atpc15798345.sgml. Also see Chris Gaudet, “GPS Receiver Guides Artillery Shell in Firing Test,” Defense News, 21 October 2002, available at http://www.defensenews.com/sgmlparse2.php?F=archive2/20021021/atpc3487872.sgml, both accessed on 10 March 2005. Artillery warhead size often limits its effectiveness in MOUT.

36. Keeter, Hunter, “Urban Operations Challenge Shows Limits of U.S., Allied ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] Capability,” Sea Power, U.S. Navy League, May 2004, available at http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/may_04_14.php, accessed 15 March 2005.

37. Field Manual 3–06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, Headquarters U.S. Army, Appendix H, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-06-11/apph.htm, accessed 1 April 2005.

38. Michaels, Jim, “Fallujah Sees Limited Progress Toward Rebuilding,” USA Today, 10 April 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-04-10-fallujah-rebuilding_x.htm, accessed 10 April 2005.

39. Leonhard.

40. Gentile, LTC Gian P., USA, “The Army Can Fight Small Wars Too,” Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD, March 2005, p. 92. See also Joint Publication 3–06, p. II–4.

41. Headquarters Marine Corps, Public Affairs Press Release 1004–04–1121, “Wargaming Exercise Highlights Lessons Learned From Iraq,” 1 October 2004, available at http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/0/58C1EA4027E14C2085256FEA0055CF38?opendocument, accessed 8 March 2005.

42. Krane. The I MEF plan for Fallujah called for an immediate push of contractors to begin reconstruction.

43 Michaels. Marine leaders warn that the slow reparation fund disbursement could turn the tide of Fallujah—and the Sunni Triangle—sentiment against the coalition. LtGen Mattis frequently espouses the critical need for “patient, persistent presence” in a counterinsurgency environment.

44. Scales, “Army Transformation: Implications for the Future,” Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 15 July 2004, available at
http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-07-15Scales.pdf, accessed 9 April 2005. April 2005 press cites new DoD requirements stressing language, foreign area officer, and joint professional military education training, indicating the cognitive transformation seed has found fertile soil.

>CDR Patch completed Joint Targeting School and served as the U.S. Central Command Chief of Targets from April 2004 to April 2005 during the active combat phase of OAF. He is currently assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence.